But it is important to clarify wbat is to be understood by "progress" in tbis context. I have proposed as a synonym "sequence," which, despite its appalling colorlessness, avoids tbe obvious implication of the word "progress" that there is adefinite, predetermined goal towards which the succession of conflicts and their resolutions is directed. I sball be assuming throughout this presentation, and shall be providing plenty of illustrations of this assumption as we proceed, that Sartre's lifelong commitment to the reality of human freedom simply precluded him from ever adhering to the notion of progress in tbe strong sense, progress towards a predetennined goal, that I have just defined. But of course the temptation to discem progressive patterns in human history always remains, especially since the apparent empirical evidence for it in. tbe domains of science and technology, if nowhere else, appears so persuasive. One has only to consider, for instance, the excitement that pervades Lyotard's account of the high-technological aspects of the "postmodern condition," despite all postmodernist suspicions of totalizing thinking and even of the very idea of dialectics. Sartre was not immune to this general temptation, reinforced as it was in his case by his interactions with Marxist ideologists who had distilled-somewhat illicitly, I would argue, but that would be another story-a prophecy of progress in the strong sense from the writings of their master thinker.
Profoundly dialectical thinking, even when it is undertaken by a believer in progress, is never unshaded, never ebulliently optimistic. Consider, for a moment, the dialectic of Hegel, both in tbe Philosophy 0/ History and in the Phenomenology 0/ Spirit. Tbe former, as everyone wbo has read it must recognize, is deeply pervaded with tragedy throughout. As he says at one point in it:
When we look at Ibis display of passionl, and the eonaequences of Ibeir violenee; Ibe UnrealOn whieh ia aaaociated, not only wilb them, but even ... with 800d designs and righteous aiml, when we see the evil, the viee, the Nin that hai befaUen the moat ßourishing kingdoms whieh the mind of men ever ereated; we ean scarce avoid being tilled wilb IOrroW at Ibis universal taint of eorroption. . . . Hiatory (is) Ibe Ilaughter-bench to which Ibe happiness of peoplea, the wisdom of States, and the virtue of individuals have been broughtas vietims. 2 In otber words, the progressive realization of God in the world, the theodicy that Hegel considers his entire Philosophy 0/ History to be, does not come cheap! But the deep-structure message of the Phenomenology, despite its "happy ending" in the brief, almost perfunctory discussion of the standpoint of Absolute Knowledge, is no different from this. In the Preface to the Phenomenology, it will be recalled, Hegel characterizes the sequence of intellectual stances that he is about to describe as a "highway of despair," and the text proper bears this out. If the famous treatment of the "Unhappy Consciousness," which attempts to recreate a medieval mind tom between unattainable Transcendence and an earthy corporeality in which it is thoroughly enmeshed even while trying to disavow it, occurs early in the narrative of spirit, some of the later dialectical interactions in that same narrative appear to come even closer to bringing Spirit to utter shipwreck; only "we," Hegel's philosophicalobservers, can clearly see that they do not do so. For example, what can be more desolate, more despairing, more abandoned, than the last words pronounced by the founder of the Christian tradition, himself regarded as incamation of divine Spirit and hence reconciliation of the Transcendent and the earthly, on the occasion that that tradition commemorates on this very day, Good Friday: "Eloi, Eloi, lama sabachthani?" ("My God, my God, why have you abandoned me?")? It is this scene that inspired, as Hegel notes in his usual highly allusive and inexplicit fashion, Martin Luther's profoundly religious hymn, "Gott Ist Tot," which is equally susceptible to the profoundly post-religious interpretation that was given to it by Nietzsche. But notice that this moment of utter abandonment comes almost at the end of the Phenomenology 0/ Spirit. lndeed, as we move onward through this very quirky hut nevertheless enormously thought-provoking work of Hegel 's, the self-destructive excesses of which Spirit is seen to be capable do not at all diminish in their intensity. The outcome of tbe dialectieal opposition between the spirit of Enlightenment and the spirit of religious insight or "superstition," for example, is the espousal of Absolute Freedom and the ensuing reign of Terror. Finally, v.,te reach the phase known as "the Beautiful Soul," in which evil, as it were, attains new heights or depths. The Beautiful Soul is the epitome of hypocrisy, preening itself on its supposed superior virtuousness while refusing forgiveness to the erstwhile transgressor who asks for it. The resolution of this dialectical impasse comes, dramatically, through the initiation of the spirit of community, which puls an end to the selfish, individualistic isolatedness of the Beautiful Soul:
Through Ibis relinquiahmenl of separate seltbood, knowledge which ... ia in I slAle ia diremplion, return. into Ibe unily oflbe aclf. The reconcilinglffinnalion, Ibe 'YCI', with which both ego. desilt from their exiSlence in opposition, . . . i. God appearing in Ibo midal of thosc who know Ibemsclvel in Ibe fonn of pure koowledge. 3 It is clear from tbe contextthat the community SO formed is to be identified as the religious community.
There folIows, in what I regard as something of an anti-elimax, the whole section on "Religion" in Hegel's Phenomenology, the last except for the concluding treatment of Absolute Knowledge that I have already mentioned.· Religion itself is shown to have various instantiations, beginning with the most crudely sensual, and Hegel's main message here concems the need for religion, in the interest of spiritual progress, to overcome picture thinking, including even tbe picture thinking that places supreme importance in such material objects of veneration as a cross or in particular human incamations of the religious spirit, such as Jesus Christ. It is a little hard to say, therefore, whether for Hegel i't is more important, as the sequence of the discussion seems to imply, to view tbe eise of the phenomenon of community as pointing to the importance of religion in tbe broadest sense, or rather to view religious phenomena as demonstrating that the human spirit can be fully realized only in community. I myself am inclined to the latter interpretation.
Let me now try to relate this back, or rather forward, to Sartre. In an overview of his philosophy up to that time that was published in 1961, I subtitled my presentation of his ultimate stance in the world "La Belle Ame. "4 This was not meant maliciously nor with the intention of identifying his philosophy with the precise details of Hegel 's very intricate and difficult account, and it was in part just a way of completing my presentation of that philosophyas incorporating, through a fascinating logic of reversal, the four so-ealled "transcendentals" of medieval, philosophia perennis, tbinking: truth, unity, goodness, and beauty. But one point that I did intend to bring out was the sense in whicb Sartre, even in tbe Marxist and therefore socially-oriented era into wbich be bad fully entered by tbat time, was always insistent on retaining bis individuality and independence, as evidenced by bis refusal to enter tbe Communist Party. At the same time, be bad by this point fully understood the centrality and, when tbey are directed towards the promotion of freedom, positive value of buman communities; this is, in asense, wbat Volume One of the Critique 0/DialecticaI Reason is about. He bad also, by tbis point, acbieved the sey:.understanding of bis earlier stance that be conveys to us in tbe dramatic language of the conclusion of Wordr: It is not at all far-fetcbed, it seems to me, to see this text at once as tbe self-description of an erstwhile beautiful soul, self-eonceited and intransigent in its sense of perfeet negation, and as a request for forgiveness from tbe larger human community of readers and admirers. Nor is the reference to an ersatz or substitute religiosity in the earlier writings a mere literary flourish or accident: nausea and anguish, it could be said, had been among tbe dominant pictures-sense-references to help convey the intellectual content-of tbat earlier thought, and by the time he wrote Wordr Sartre bad begun to question those metaphors. In other words, to set aside the Hegelian references now, Sartre bad good reason to ask just wbat nausea and anguish had to do with socialism, the name that marked the imagined community of free individuals, purged of relationships of dominance and subordination, that was his future project and that of Iike-minded individuals in a world whose historical totalization was becoming increasingly One even as differences multiplied and intensified.
This turn of thought, in contrast to tbe romantic embracing of a kind of resolute abandonment that characterizes, by his own admission, the early Sartre, sounds remarkably hopeful; it sounds like a commitment to the possibility, ifnot Nothingness Sartrean texts that suggest an access, if not an exeess, of hope as completely replacing the skeptical doubt of tbe old days. For example, in the Cahiers, where at one point he relegates the aecounts of eoncrete relations with others to the description of a special case, the hell of the passions, as distinguished from the whole range of relationships, there are a few passages in whieh Sartre appears to treat a radical, even apocalyptie, top-to-bottom conversion of human society as a really coneeivable possibility. There are also passages in which he takes very seriously the idea of progress. But the final upshot of these passages, at least as I distill them, is on the side of suspieiousness and skepticism rather than on that of unbridled hopefulness about progress;~y favorite is the followmg:
The past becomel progreuive throuah the hypothelil-project of preaent Progress, which i. adecision to orient History. . . . It i. quile obvious abat we ean't abink abat wo Ire happier than the Romana (for abe unhappy population il more numerous in ablOlule numberl), nor that our atate il more jusI, but only abat we are in a better position (even~f more unhappy) to realizc a happy Ind just aociety.6
What we are establishing here in Sartre's post-Being anti Nothingness thinking, obviously,~s a truly dialectical approach to the idea of progress, one that seems to me more accurately to capture the eomplexity of historical reality than either the early Sartrets and many others t love affair with anguish, or the hyper-optimism of the advocates of bope malgre tout, or tbe fashionable postmodemist rejection of the possibility of speaking in any sense of bistory as totalization. (I am assuming some familiarity with the philosophically crucial distinetion, made by Sartre in the Critique, between "totalization" and "totality," a distinetion tbat those who like to dismiss virtually every important modem theorist as a totalizing thinker fmd it convenient to overlook.) This dialectic is retlected very weil in the pages of the two volumes of the Critique, whieh combine sueh texts as the progress-suffused paragraph at the end of the first volume eoneeming the importanee of proceeding from the sychronie analysis of social ensembles previously undertaken to the diachronie one of History as totalization to follow, on the one hand, and the depressing diseussion of the ultimately fatal "deviation," as Sartre calls it, of historieal socialism in the U.S.S.R. that eventually eomes to dominate Volume Two, on the other hand.
This dialeetie is also weil captured, 1 think in the work of Ronald Aronson: in his book, The Dialeetics 0/Disaster, sub-titled "A Prefaee to Hope," and in his ongoing manuscripts, of whieh 1 have been privileged to read portions, on progress. 1 would like to urge that a hearty dose of Sartre's unblinking realism and honesty in approaehing the study of society and history , together with some of the eoneeptual and methodological maehinery from the Crilique and elsewhere in bis writings, is needed now more than ever as we try to understand the rapidly unfolding events in Eastern Europe and the (former) U.S.S.R., events that mark the apparent severing of all vestiges of eonnection between the ideal of soeialism as eommunity and the historie "Socialisme Qui Venait du Froid," as Sartre called it, Soviet socialism.
But there is a potentially serious problem of interpretation for Sartre seholarship when it comes to assessing bis ultimate position with respect to both the appropriate intensity of historical hope and, especially, the nature of human eommunity. For we have the eurious document to whieh the editors of Le Nouvel Observateur, in whieh it was first published, gave the title, "L' Espoir, maintenant," and whieh the editors of Dissent, in whieh a translation appeared, for their own purposes ealled "The Last Words of Jeao-Paul Sartre"-a document that bas seemed to same to constitute a repudiation, for hetter of worse, of his earlier thinking about these topies. It is to a consideration of some aspects of this document that 1 now wish to turn. (The original occasion of these reflections was the tenth anniversary, within roughly a month, of the original printing of these words and the aetual tenth anniversary of Sartre's death. Sinee it was Good Friday, it was also an occasion for those with an interest, whether out of eommitment or out of historical, Iiterary, or philosophieal euriosity, in the Christian narrative to reeall those other so-ealled last words, previously cited, whieh in many senses turned out not to be that narrative's last words at all.) . Let me briefly recall some of the circumstanees of this document. It is a transcription of three short snatches of taped dialogue between Sartre and Benny Levy, the aide and collaborator of Sartre's last years, whose own itinerary bad already progressed from "Maoist" student aetivist to politico-religious thinker with a revived interest in his Jewish roots, and who has since become a leader in a religious commune in Strasbourg. At the beginning of the dialogue, Sartre (a) insists, agaiDst Uvy's attempted reconstroction ofhis past philosophy as ODe of despair, that he has always thought of hope as a fundamental aspect of being human; (b) attributes bis early talk of despair and Angst to the fashion of the day rather than to personal experience; and (c) asserts that he has been seeking to ground a social morality that would escape the impasse described in Being anti NOlhiIJgness as the impossible desire to be God, itself based in the Christian tradition's definition of God as causa sui, and acknowledges that tbis and no other is the tradition out of wbich he has come and within and against which he must therefore react. Later, he expresses gratitude over the enrichment that his discussions about Judaism with Uvy have brought to bis own tbinking, in particular aspects of Jewish Messianism that he says non-Jews like himself would like~o appropriate for other purposes, notably in support of a certain idea of revolution.
. I do not wish here to dweil so much on the exact historical circumstances of this dialogue and especially of the publication, with which others are at any rate no doubt more familiar than I. As for the dialogue's construction, there is a clear sense in wbich, I think, it is Uvy more than Sartre who calls the tune; and it is Uvy who decides on the topics to be discussed, who usually (but not always) determines the thought transitions, and who on occasion peremptorily asserts the opposite of what Sartre has just maintained, before moving on. Uvy's tone is frequently very accusatory towards Sartre: he sees the latter, with whose works he has a considerable familiarity, as having been fundamentally wrong on a number of points, and he tries to get Sartre to admit tbis. Sartre, on the other hand, is generally compliant and conciiiatory, apparently trying to concede as much as he honestly thinks he can, and on some points making no comment when this would have been in order, while still maintaining throughout that there are issues on which they simply disagree. Does this contrast in stances, between an intellectually aggressive young discussion leader and a physically very feeble old man who is constantly being called upon either to renounce, modify, or defend previous positions, amount to a malicious manipulation, as some have claimed? Not necessarily. Sartre accepted this situation and, as we know, insisted on publication. He enjoyed at least some of the verbal sparring, appreciated what Uvy had given him by way of, for example, a greatly heightened understanding of Judaism, and made it clear that he regarded himself as an old man only because that was the way others labeled hirn. In their dialogues, Uvy did not treat him with the deference and special respect usually accorded to much older persons. But Sartre, egalitarian to tbe end, seems not to bave demanded or even wished sueh deference and respect, at least in this one relationsbip. While one might personally disapprove of Uvy's manner of dealing with Sartre in tbis dialogue, tbe eharge of malicious manipulation seems fully sustainable only if we assume tbat Sartre was really "not in his right mind" during the recording periods. I admit to having onee thougbt tbis myself, to baving reaeted with tbe standard, morally unacceptable ageist language of "senility" when I undertook a first, superficial reading of the dialogue. But reconsideration has long since convinced me tbat, while Sartre was at times slower here to cballenge his interlocutor's assertions than he would ooce have been and henee makes errors of judgment in letting certain claims pass with which he is clearly uncomfortable, on the whole he was at that time still fully capable of serious reflective thinking even if many of his other facullies bad deserted hirn, and hence merits heing taken seriously in what he has to say.
At the elose of tbe preliminary discussioD of hope that I have already recounted, Sartre says that at any rate sinee 1945 he has helieved in hope, although there is admittedly a deep eontradietion between this belief and his recognition of the inevitability of failure in human affairs. Sooo thereafter, he aeknowledges that he has not always said quite what he has meant to say, particularly in support of the now-foundering Left, and that this points to the failure in his own work. On the other hand, he has always retained an admittedly naive belief in progress, so that be continues to antieipate some perhaps distant future time wben wbat be has written will be able to be seen to fall into place within a larger general historical pattern. Pinally, at the very end of the dialogue, he expresses discouragement over the dominance of Rightist tendeneies everywhere-in the Soviet Union, in tbe United States, and even in Sweden, where the eonservative party had just won an election-, over wars (especially that in Afghanistan) and rumors of war, and generally over the ugliness of "the world·of today, whieh is horrible." Since 1975, before wbieh be had still been a "sixty-eighter, " imbued with tbe ideas of that banner year of hope, he says that be has been strongly tempted for the second time in his life to fall into deep despair. (The first time was the period of the Gerrnan Occupation.) This would be easy to do, he adds, for someone who will die in five or ten years at most. However, be still wishes to construcl a basis for hope after all, sinee "hope has always been one of the dominant forces of revolutions and of insurrections," and to explain "how I still feel hope as my conception of tbe future... 7 Before tuming at last to the question of the nature of community in this dialogue and, by extension, in Sartre's thought as a whole, I would like to add a few final comments on tbis pervasive theme of hope. Hope is first and foremost, it seems to me, a mental attitude and not a philosophical position. It can enter into philosophical discourse in various ways, such as, as we have seen, through theology or altematively through a secular "theology" that asserts some historical inevitability or other. But since it is above all an attitude that we are considering, my philosophical instincts are not at all disturbed by Sartre's obvious wavering, even within this one dialogue, over whether to be optimistic or pessinUstic, for this is normal in avery thoughtful person and does not represent a genuine philosophical contradiction. Nor is there anything in Sartre's remarks about hope that should be found shocking by bis public, at least by those who are familiar with the outlines of the long evolution of bis political theory, despite Uvy's suggestion at the outset that it is astonishing. After all, as sorne of Sartre's own comments in the dialogue remind us, it would have made no sense for someone with an outlook of complete hopelessness or despair to have laken many of the political stances that he did over the years.
It is with respeCt to the domain of the nature of human relationships and community, rather than to such sensational but essentially unserious and ultimately unanswerable questions as those of whether Sartre ever personally experienced deep Angst and just how optimistic or pessimistic he "really" was in the final analysis, that this dialogue has the most interest for understanding his theoretical outlook at the end of his Iife. Already in an interview conducted by Michel Sicard in 1918, Sartre had claimed that the new ethical theory that he was in the process of working out with Uvy differed from his earlier ones at an ontological level (to the point that it "requires regarding the ontology that I have developed up to now as incomplete and false"), in that he now accepted the reality of an interpenetration of consciousnesses, in fact of a human community that is more integrated than the terminology of a confrontation of 1Le Nouvel Observaleur no. 802, le 24 man 1980, p. 139, my translation.
"consciousnesses" implies. 8 He had contrasted this conception of what might be called intemal relations among human beings with a more extemal perspective tbat he bad attributed to Man. But he had then proceeded to turn the interview in a new direction by observing tbat the matter was quite complicated and that it would need to be explained at great length. Here, in his dialogue with Uvy, he picks up on tbe latterts suggestion, made in response to Sartre's lament that the trouble with the vanishing political Left is that it never clearly spelled out its fundamental principles, that there is just such a principle, a broadly applicable one, to be found in the history of Leftist movements, namely, jralernity. Sartre then proceeds to reflect on just what fratemity might mean. These sparse reflections, interconnected as tbey are withother remarks in the dialogue conceming the importance of ethics, constitute, in my view, its core philosophical interest.
In "running witb" Uvy's suggestion about fraternity, Sartre exhibits such entbusiasm that Uvy eventually feels obliged to caution him against falling into mytb, comparable to Socrates t "Founding Myth" about the three types of citizens, all offspring of the common mother, earth, in the Republic. For Sartre goes on to say that Marx's theory of superstructures completely falsified the nature of human society by overlooking the importance of fratemity, that he himself had begun to work on the notion of fratemity in the Crilique but had not gotten very far with it, that in fact fratemity is the first human relationship, and that he likes to think of every man he sees as sharing with him a common mother. Although be cautions that this principle of "fratemity" should not be laken in a biologically literal way, he nevertheless allows his excitement about it to lead him into exceedingly mythical formulations, including one about totemism that envisages all "brothers" as having a single, non-individualized mother who "can as weil be a totemic bird." (The reader is reminded of Aristotle's letter from exile near the end of his Iife, where he says that he has begun again to read and to be attracted by the ancient myths.) But with the help of Uvy's sharp questioning conceming the literal, non-mythical, point of all this, Sartre finally arrives at a fonnulation of fratemity as a future possible experience, the realization of "the end that all men have in themselves, Man." And this can only be achieved in a regime beyond scarcity, through Ethics.
BIn Obliques, special issue, 1979, p. IS. Portions of the remainder of the presenl paper are lo be found on pp. 206-208 ofmy book, Sartre's Political Theory (Bloomington; Indiana U. P., 1991) This entire, frustratingly brief text can be regarded as a kind of Rorscbach Test conceming Sartre's final pbilosophical position. Read in one way, especially in conjunction with the lines from the Sicard interview that I bave cited, it amounts to a tborougbgoing repudiation of past positions. Read in anotber way, in ligbt of its circumstances, it sbould be seen as an instance, if not of manipulation, tben at least of "complaisance" towards Uvy on Sartre's part: that is, of giving Uvy the answers, at least within certain bounds of credibility, that Sartre antieipates (not always accurately) that Uvy will want to bear. Read in yet another way, it is merely a final (not logieally or conceptually final, but temporally so) expression of a long, eontinuous evolution in Sartre's tbinking about the "we," about community, that began witb the widespread dissatisfac'tion, evinced by critics and even by de Beau'voir (in The Ethics 0/ Ambiguity) and eventually feit by Sartre bimself as shown in the Cahiers and in the Critique, over tbe excessively individualistic description of almost exclusively conflictual human relationships to be found in Being and Nothingness. (Tbe passage in the Cahiers in which the earlier work is said to have confined itself to tbe hell of the passions, and hence not to have dealt with all possible human relations, must be reealled here.) Read in yet a fourth way, in ligbt of Sartre's "Iaid-back" attitude conceming his own work and bis insouciance, espeeially in later years, about criteria of consistency from one work to another, it is an affair of no great moment, to which some critics have, for the most diverse reasons, attaehed much more importance than it deserves.
There is surely some merit to all of these interpretations and no doubt to others that I have not articulated here. In "strictly ontologieal terms"-if, as I rather doubt, this pbrase has an univocal meaning-, there is obviously a sharp contrast between tbe confrontational "etres-pour-autrui" of Being and NOlhingIJess and the interpenetrating fraternal consciousnesses of the Sicard interview and the Uvy dialogue. Dut on the other band, the exploration of the phenomenon of the group in fusion in the Crit;que should be seen precisely as Sartre's careful, detailed way of bridging the gulf between these two maps of human community. Both, after all , are based in the Iived experiences of virtually everyone. I still do not agree with Ronald Aronson 's contention in his otherwise almost impeccable book, Sartre's Second Cr;tique, to the effect that Sartre's account of society remains too individualisticand needs to be supplemented with an ontologieal notion that he ealls "society," nor do I think that any or all of these late hints about community amount to an admission by Sartre that Heidegger was right after all about the Mitsein as ontologically prior, or that human community has reality in any normatively interesting sense before human beings engage in hard struggle to create it.
By the same token, there is an apparent absolute opposition between the earlier Sartrean proposition that conflict is at the heart of human relationships and his statement in this dialogue that fraternity is or at least should be a first principle; but in fact, to the sensitive, dialectical mind, they may both be equally true simultaneously, as the old line of Latin verse, "Odi et amo," reminds us with classic simplicity. I am more disturbed by the unfortuoate continuity between the male biases of Sartre's writings and bis use of the term, "fratemity," in the dialogue than I am by any alleged rupture here, which to me would be very disturbing if it were tme, with bis earlier insistence on the centrality of conflict and potential conflict in human relationships as they have existed up to now.
In the remark that I have cited from the dialogue conceming lethe end that all men have in themselves, Man, " Sartre does indeed seem to be embracing an idealistic conception of a universal human nature, as weil as an implicit Aristotelian philosophy of potentiality and final causality, that is strongly at odds with much of his intellectual evolution, culminating in his emphasis on the "singular universal" in The Family Idiot, as I see it. But ,the rapid-fire structure of the relatively brief interchange permits him no time to reflect upon this fonnulation or to qualify it, and so it would be amistake to take it too seriously as a full-blown new worldview in Sartre's intellectual life. Indeed, within the terms of the dialogue as we bave it, this remark has the force of above all expressing in the simplest, most straightforward language a deep Sartrean longing that can be discemed throughout his career, in isolated but significant earlier passages-in references, for example, to a "radical conversion" within a sociohistorical context in the Cahiers, to the possibility of "group praxis forever" in the Critique, and, less rhetorically, to our emerging "One World" in several writings. lt was, in fact, the longing, the conviction expressed in these "Last Words" of bis, that somehow all men are at least in principle "brothers, .. or rather siblings, despite the overwhelming predominance of conflict in this world of scarcity, that underlay Sartre's commitment over three and a half decades to the political ideals of socialism and freedom. "Socialism" is, as far as I can ascertain, never mentioned as such, and freedom as a philosophical concept receives no special emphasis, in the dialogue with Uvy, and yet these ideas inform the entire discussion. Even Uvy, who has obviously come to see great value in more traditional institutions, such as elections and religion,that meant little or nothing positive to him at an earlier time in his life, continues to feel a solidarity of opposition to the triumphaot political Right, which he characterizes as ..salope ft (filthy) when in the dialogue Sartre refers to it as ftmiserable. ft For Sartre at the end of bis life, then, the goal of a commun;ty of free human beings, freely entered into and maintained, remains the goal, even though the means for reaching it appear less clear then ever and even the very names with which it was once labeled, including now even that of ftsocialism, ft have come under suspicion~y virtue of our shared historical experiences., Purdue University 231
